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Governments Unilateral withdrawal from international obligations and it’s legal consequences with emphasis on JCPOA
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Maryam Hendi *   , Mohsen Taheri |
| Islamic Azad, Semnan,lran |
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Abstract: (420 Views) |
| Many actions and decisions of governments in the international arena are unilaterally implemented and adopted. Perhaps this is a natural feature of today's world. Governments commit themselves to unilateral actions and consider themselves entitled to unilateral actions by other states. For this reason, "unilateralism" has been described as a "highly significant" feature in international relations. Islamic Republic of Iran is considered as a security threat to the West, especially the United States. Thus, the West offered two general approaches to limiting Iran's nuclear capacity, one of which was a peaceful solution or punitive measures, and the other was a military confrontation. The West first accepted the first solution, which was also in line with the UN Charter, which emphasized on the multilateralism and the role of international organizations. Negotiations between Iran and the six world powers eventually led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under this agreement, Iran accepted broad restrictions on its nuclear program and in return lifted UN sanctions, as well as unilateral US and European sanctions. Because this agreement was related to international security, the same agreement was approved by the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, the Americans considered Burjam as an agreement that is against the national interest and withdrew it unilaterally. The United States has been the most serious and clear example of the Security Council's ineffectiveness in safeguarding an agreement on international peace and security. |
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| Keywords: JCPOA, Iran Nuclear Program, US, UN Security Council |
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Full-Text [PDF 943 kb]
(61 Downloads)
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Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Special
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