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Public Ownership and Corporate Governance in Quasi-State Companies: Court of Accounts Criteria
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Behyar MoghimiSarani *   |
| Prosecutor, Prosecutor’s Office of the Supreme Audit Court of Iran |
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Abstract: (114 Views) |
This study clarifies the scope of the Supreme Audit Court’s oversight by operationalizing “public ownership” in Iran’s public law. It starts from Article 2 (note) of the Supreme Audit Court Act, which extends oversight beyond budget-funded entities to any unit to which public ownership attaches under Articles 44 and 45 of the Constitution, yet practice lacks a consistent definition. Using normative legal analysis of fiqh foundations, constitutional principles, and financial and sectoral statutes, the paper builds a testable framework. Drawing on the Anfal doctrine and constitutional supremacy, “publicness” is treated as the rule and “privateness” as the exception. Four determinants are specified: public origin or statutory allocation, effective sovereign control, public service or monopoly features, and fiscal linkage to the budget with risk to public funds. For audit adjudication, the article proposes a criteria table (ten indicators) and a three-step test that distinguishes entity-based oversight (where state ownership predominates) from activity-based oversight over flows of public funds and targeted schemes. Findings show corporate form alone is not a reliable basis for exclusion and that the boundary can be drawn through reasoned, verifiable assessment. The contribution is a practical guide for budgetary aids, deposits, and exclusive public services, reducing divergence in jurisdictional determinations. |
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| Keywords: Corporate governance, Court of Accounts, Public funds, Public ownership, Quasi-state companies. |
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Full-Text [PDF 645 kb]
(22 Downloads)
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Type of Study: Applicable |
Subject:
Special
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